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ABSTRACTION PRIOR TO SPEECH/
BY PROF, TH. RIBOT.
SAVE in extremely rare cases,^ where the mind, like a mirror,
passively reflects external impressions, intellectual activity
may always be reduced to one of the two following types : asso-
ciating, combining, unifying ; or dissociating, isolating, and sepa-
rating. These cardinal operations underlie all forms of cognition,
from the lowest to the highest, and constitute its unity of compo-
sition.
Abstraction belongs to the second type. It is a normal and
necessary process of the mind, dependent on attention, i. e., on
the limitation, willed or spontaneous, of the field of consciousness.
The act of abstraction implies in its genesis negative and positive
conditions, and is the result of both.
The negative conditions consist essentially in the fact that we
cannot apprehend more than one quality or one aspect, varying
according to the circumstances, in any complex whole,—because
consciousness, like the retina, is restricted to a narrow region of
clear perception.
The positive condition is a state which has been appropriately
termed a "psychical reinforcement" of that which is being ab-
stracted, and it is naturally accompanied by a weakening of that
which is abstracted from. The true characteristic of abstraction
is this partial increment of intensity. While involving elimination,
it is actually a positive mental process. The elements or qualities
of a percept or a representation which we omit do not necessarily
involve such suppression. We leave them out of account simply
because they do not suit our ends for the moment, and are com-
plementary.^
1 Translated from the French by Frances A. Welby.
2 For example, in moments of surprise and in states approximating to pure sensation.
SSchmidkunz, Ueber dit Abstraction. Halle: Strieker, 1889. This little work of forty-three
pages contains a good historical and theoretical exposition of the question.
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Abstraction being, then, in spite of negative appearances, a
positive operation, how are we to conceive it? Attention is neces-
sary to it, but it is more than attention. It is an augmentation of
intensity, but it is more than an augmentation of intensity. Sup-
pose a group of representations a-\- b-\- c^=d. To abstract from b
and c in favor of a, would ostensibly give a =d— {b -\- c). If this
were so, b and c would be retained unaltered in consciousness ;
there would be no abstraction. On the other hand, since it is im-
possible for the whole representation d to be suppressed outright,
b and c cannot be totally obliterated. They subsist, accordingly,
in a residual state which may be termed x, and the abstract repre-
sentation is hence not a but a -\- x or A. Thus the elements of ab-
stract representations are the same as those of concrete represen-
tations ; only some are strengthened, others weakened : whence
arise new groupings. Abstraction, accordingly, consists in the
formation of new groups of representations which, while strength-
ening certain elements of the concrete representations, weaken
other elements of the same.^
We see from the above that abstraction depends genetically
upon the causes which awaken and sustain attention. I have de-
scribed these causes elsewhere, ^ and cannot here return to their
consideration.
It is sufficient to remark that abstraction, like attention, may
be instinctive, spontaneous, and natural ; or reflective, voluntary,
and artificial. In the first category the abstraction of a quality or
mode of existence originates in some attraction, or from utility
;
hence it is a common manifestation of intellectual life and is even
met with, as we shall see, among many of the lower animals. In
its second form, the rarer and more exalted, it proceeds less from
the qualities of the object than from the will of the subject ; it pre-
supposes a choice, an elimination of negligible elements, which is
often laborious, as well as the difficult task of maintaining the ab-
stract element clearly in consciousness. In fine, it is always a spe-
cial application of the attention which, adapted as circumstances
1 Schmidkunz, loc. cit. This author, who rightly insists upon the positive character of ab
straction (which is too frequently considered as a negation) observes that no concept, not even
that of infinity, is in its psychological genesis the result of negation, for, "in order to deduce
from the idea of a finite thing the idea of infinity, it is first necessary to abstract from that thing
its quality of finality, which is certainly a positive act; subsequently, in order to reach infinity,
it is sufficient either constantly to increase the time, magnitude, and intensity of the finite
which is a positive process ; or to deny the limits of the finite, which is tantE(mount to denying the
negation."
2 Psychology ofAttention. Chicago : The Open Court Publishing Co.
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require to observation, synthesis, action, etc., here functions as an
instrument of analysis.
A deeply-rooted prejudice asserts that abstraction is a mental
act of relative infrequency. This fallacy obtains in current par-
lance, where "abstract" is a synonym of difficult, obscure, inac-
cessible. This is a psychological error resulting from an incom-
plete view : all abstraction is illegitimately reduced to its higher
forms. The faculty of abstracting, from the lowest to the highest
degrees, is constantly the same : its development is dependent on
that of (general) intelligence and of language ; but it exists in em-
bryo even in those primitive operations which are properly con-
cerned with the concrete, i. e., perception and representation.
Several recent authors have emphasised this point.^
Perception is par excelleiice the faculty of cognising the
concrete. It strives to embrace all the qualities of its object with-
out completely succeeding, because it is held in check by an inter-
nal foe,—the natural tendency of the mind to simplify and to elim-
inate. The same horse, at a given moment, is not perceived in the
same manner by a jockey, a veterinary surgeon, a painter and a
tyro. To each of these, certain qualities, which vary individually,
stand in relief, and others recede into the background. Except in
cases of methodical and prolonged investigation (where we have
observation, and not perception) there is always an unconscious
selection of some principal characteristics which, grouped to-
gether, become a substitute for the totality. It must not be for-
gotten that perception is pre- eminently a practical operation, that
its mainspring is interest or utility, and that in consequence we neg-
lect— i. e., leave in the field of obscure consciousness—whatever at
the moment concerns neither our desires nor our purposes. It
would be superfluous to review all the forms of perception (visual,
auditory, tactual, etc.), and to show that they are governed by this
same law of utility ; but it should be remarked that the natural
mechanism by which the strengthened elements and the weakened
elements are separated, is a rude cast of what subsequently be-
comes abstraction, that the same forces are in play, and are ulti-
mately reducible to some definite direction given to the attention.
With the image, the intermediate stage between percept and
concept, the reduction of the object represented to a few funda-
mental features, is still more marked. Not merely is there among
the different representations which I may have of some man, dog,
or tree, one that for the time being necessarily excludes the others
ISee especially Hoeffding, Psychologic. German translation. Second Edition, pp. 223 et seq.
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(my oak tree perforce appears to me in summer foliage, tinted by
autumn, or bereft of leaves,—in bright light or in shade), but even
this individual, concrete representation which prevails over the
others is no more than a sketch, a reduction of reality with many
details omitted. Apart from the exceptionally gifted men in whom
mental vision and mental audition are perfect, and wholly com-
mensurate (as it would seem) with perception, the representations
which we call exact are never so, except in their most general fea-
tures. Compare the image we have, with our eyes closed, of a
monument with the perception of the monument itself ; the re-
membrance of a melody with its vocal or instrumental execution.
In the average man, the image, the would-be copy of reality inva-
riably suffers a conspicuous impoverishment, which is enormous in
the less lavishly endowed ; it is here reduced to a mere schema,
limited to the inferior concepts.
Doubtless it may be objected that the work of dissociation in
perception and representation is incomplete and partial. It would
be strange and illogical indeed if the abstract were to triumph in
the very heart of the concrete ; we do but submit that it is here in
germ, in embryonic shape. And hence, when abstraction appears
in its true form, as the consciousness of one unique quality isolated
from the rest, it is no new manifestation but a fruition, it is a sim-
plification of simplifications.
The state of consciousness thus attained, by the fixation of at-
tention on one quality exclusively, and by its ideal dissociation
from the rest, becomes, as we know, a notion which is neither in-
dividual nor general, but abstract,—and this is the material of gen-
eralisation.
The sense of identity, the power of apprehending resem-
blances, is, as has justly been said, "the keel and backbone of our
thinking"; without it we should be lost in the incessant stream of
things.^ Are there in nature any complete resemblances, any ab-
solutely similar events? It is extremely doubtful. It might be
supposed that a person who reads a sentence several times in suc-
cession, who listens several times to the same air, who tastes all
the four quarters of the same fruit, would experience in each case
an identical perception. But this is not so. A little reflexion will
show that besides differences in time, in the varying moods of the
subject, and in the cumulative effect of repeated perceptions, there
is at least between the first perception and the second, that radical
difference which separates the new from the repeated. In fact, the
1 W. James, Psychology.'%^o\. I,, p. 459.
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material given us by external and internal experience consists of
resemblances alloyed by differences which vary widely in degree,
—
in other words, analogies. The perfect resemblance assumed be-
tween things vanishes as we come to know them better. At first
sight a new people exhibits to the traveller a well-determined gen-
eral type ; later, the more he observes, the more apparent uni-
formity is resolved into varieties. "I have taken the trouble,"
says Agassiz, "to compare thousands of individuals of the same
species ; in one case I pushed the comparison so far as to have
placed side by side 27,000 specimens of one and the same shell
(genus Neretina). I can assure you that in these 27,000 specimens
I did not find two that were perfectly alike."
Is this faculty of grasping resemblances—the substrate of gen-
eralisation
—
primitive, in the absolute signification of the word ?
Does it mark the first awakening of the mind, in point of cogni-
tion? For several contemporary writers (Spencer, Bain, Schnei-
der, and others) the consciousness of difference is the primordial
factor; the consciousness of resemblance comes later. Others up-
hold the opposite contention.^ As a matter of fact this quest for
ihe primuni cognituni is beyond our grasp ; like all genetical ques-
tions, it eludes our observation and experience.
No conclusion can be formed save on purely logical argu-
ments, and each side advances reasons that carry a certain weight.
There is, moreover, at the bottom of the whole discussion, the
grave error of identifying the embryonic state of the mind with its
adult forms, and of presupposing a sharp initial distinction be-
tween discrimination and assimilation. The question must remain
open, incapable of positive solution by our psychology. The in-
contestable truth with regard to the mind, as we know it in its de-
veloped and organised state, is that the two processes advance
pari passu, and are reciprocally causative.
In sum, abstraction and generalisation considered as elemen-
tary acts of the mind, and reduced to their simplest conditions, in-
volve two processes :
I. The former, abstraction, implies a dissociative process,
1 Herbert Spencer, Principles of Psychology. Vol. I., Part 2, Chapter H.—Bain (in the last
chapter of Emotions and Will ) says that nothing more fundamental can possibly be assigned as
a mark of intelligence than the feeling of difference between consecutive or co-existing impres-
sions. " There are cases, however, where agreement imparts the shock requisite for rousing the
intellectual wave ; but it is agreement so qualified as to be really a mode of difference. For
review and ample discussion of this problem see Ladd's Psychology, Descriptive and Explana-
tory, Chapter XIV. The earlier psychologists, in considering the ''faculty of comparison'
which acts by resemblance and difference, as primordial, had observed the same fact, although
they described it in different terrns.
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operating on the raw data of experience. It has subjective causes
which are ultimately reducible to attention. It has objective
causes which may be due to the fact that a determinate quality is
given us as an integral part of widely different groups.
''Any total impression whose elements are never experienced
apart must be unanalysable. If all cold things were wet and all wet
things cold, if all liquids were transparent and no non-liquid were
transparent, we should scarcely discriminate between coldness and
wetness and scarcely ever invent separate names for liquidity and
transparency. . . . What is associated now with one thing and now
with another tends to become dissociated from either, and to grow
into an object of abstract contemplation by the mind. One might
call this the law of dissociation by varying concomitants." ^
2. The latter, generalisation, originates in association by re-
semblance, but even in its lowest degree it rises beyond this, since
it implies a synthetic act of fusion. It does not, in fact, consist in
the successive excitation of similar or analogous percepts, as in the
case where the image of St. Peter's in Rome suggests to me that
of St. Paul's in London, of the Pantheon in Paris, and of other
churches with enormous dimensions, of like architecture, and with
gigantic domes. It is a condensation. The mind resembles a cru-
cible with a precipitate of common resemblances at the bottom,
while the differences have been volatilised. In proportion as we
recede from this primitive and elementary form, the constitution
of the general idea demands other psychological conditions which
cannot be hastily enumerated.
And thus we reach the principal aim of our inquiry which
purports, not to reinforce the time-worn dispute as to the nature
of abstraction and generalisation, but to pursue these opera-
tions step by step in their development, and multiform aspects.
Directly we pass beyond pure individual representation we reach
an ascending scale of notions which, apart from the general char-
acter possessed by all, are extremely heterogeneous in their na-
ture, and imply distinct mental habits. The question so often dis-
cussed as to "What takes place in the mind when we are thinking
by general ideas?" is not to be disposed of in one definite answer,
but finds variable response according to the circumstances. In
order to give an adequate reply, the principal degrees of this scale
must first be determined. And for this we require an objective
notation which shall give them some external, though not arbitrary,
mark.
'i-'^
.^|2^a.&%, Psychology. Vol. I., pp. 502 and 506.
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The first distinguishing mark is given by the absence or pres-
ence of words. Abstraction and generalisation, with no possible
aid from language, constitute the inferior group which some recent
writers have designated by the appropriate name oi generic images'^
—a term which clearly shows their intermediate nature between
the pure image, and the general notion, properly so called.
The second class, which we have termed intermediate abstrac-
tion, implies the use of words. At their lowest stage these con-
cepts hardly rise above the level of the generic image : they can be
reduced to a vague schema, in which the word is almost a super-
fluous accompaniment. At a stage higher the parts are inverted :
the representative schema becomes more and more impoverished,
and is obliterated by the word, which rises in consciousness to the
first rank.
Finally, the third class, that of the higher concepts, has for its
distinguishing mark that it can no longer be represented. If any
image arises in consciousness it does not sensibly assist the move-
ment of thought, and may even impede it. Everything, appar-
ently, at least, is subordinated to language.
This enumeration of the stages of abstraction can for the pres-
ent only be given roughly and broadly. Every phase of its
evolution should be studied in itself, and accurately determined by
its internal and external characteristics. As to the legitimacy, the
objective and practical value, of this schematic distribution, noth-
ing less than a detailed exploration from one end to the other of
our subject, can confirm or overthrow it.
We shall go over certain of the lower forms, dwelling upon
these at some length, because they are usually neglected, or alto-
gether omitted. This is the pre-linguistic period of abstraction and
generalisation : words are totally wanting ; they are an unknown
factor. How far is it possible without the aid of language to tran-
scend the level of perception, and of consecutive images, and to
attain a more elevated intellectual standpoint ? In replying empir-
ically, we have three fairly copious sources of information : ani-
mals, children who have not yet acquired speech, and uneducated
deaf-mutes. We shall speak of this in subsequent articles.
IThistermis borrowed from the well-known works of Galton on composite photographs,
which are scarcely more than twenty years old. Huxley in his book on Hume (Chapter IV.) ap-
pears to be the first who introduced it into psychology, as shown by the following passage :
" This mental operation may be rendered comprehensible by considering what takes place in the
formation of compound photographs—when the images of the faces of six sitters, for example,
are each received on the same photographic plate, for a sixth of the time requisite to take one
portrait. The final result is that all those points in which the six faces agree are brought out
strongly, while all those in which they differ are left vague ; and thus what maybe termed a
generic portrait of the six is produced. Thus our ideas of single complex impressions are incom-
plete in one way, and those of numerous, more or less similar, complex impressions are incom-
plete in another way ; that is to say, they are generic. . . . And hence it follows that our ideas ot
the impressions in question are not, in the strict sense of the word, copies of those impressions
;
while at the-same" time they may exist in the mind independently of language." Romanes em-
ploys the'word " recept " for " generic images," as marking their intermediate place between the
"percept " which is below, and the " concept" which is above them.
